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Equilibrium and optimal-action choices in formally specified generated games.

Source
Generated
Score
ModelAxes score, λ = 1
Ladder
structural · difficulty level · 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Items
Not built yet
Dimensions
stream (5)

No results yet: this benchmark is planned and is not part of any score. Everything on this page describes the plan and may change before it ships.

The plan

Draft spec

Written up in a draft specification; details may change once items are built and piloted.

What it will measure

Strategic reasoning in formally specified games: finding equilibria, backward induction, eliminating dominated strategies and bargaining.

How items will be built

  • Five streams: the pure equilibria of a payoff matrix, the mixed equilibrium of a small game, the subgame-perfect path through a game tree, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and alternating-offers bargaining.
  • Each stream grows over 6 rungs (matrices from 2×2 to 8×8, trees from depth 2 to 8, bargaining from 2 to 12 rounds). Games are generated so the answer is unique, and solved exactly.
  • 20% of items also come as a story and as a trap: named after a famous game ("This is a Prisoner's Dilemma…") with the payoffs changed so the famous answer is wrong.

How it will be scored

  • Exact answers graded by code; +1 / 0 / −1.
  • x50 per stream, and for equilibrium and dominance sets, precision and recall (missing an equilibrium versus inventing one).
  • How often the famous answer shows up on the trap versions.

Example (burned: never used in a scored release)

Player 1 chooses U or D; Player 2 chooses L or R. Payoffs (Player 1, Player 2): U and L gives 3, 0; U and R gives 0, 2; D and L gives 1, 3; D and R gives 2, 1. Give each player's equilibrium probabilities as exact fractions.

AnswerPlayer 1 plays U with probability 1/2; Player 2 plays L with probability 1/2.

The game has no pure equilibrium, so the unique equilibrium is fully mixed.

Planned size900 items (5 streams × 6 rungs × 30).